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ABSTRACT
One of the most challenging problems in computational advertising
is the prediction of click-through and conversion rates for bidding
in online advertising auctions. An unaddressed problem in previous
approaches is the existence of highly non-uniform misprediction
costs. While for model evaluation these costs have been taken into
account through recently proposed business-aware offline metrics –
such as the Utility metric which measures the impact on advertiser
profit – this is not the case when training the models themselves. In
this paper, to bridge the gap, we formally analyze the relationship
between optimizing the Utility metric and the log loss, which is
considered as one of the state-of-the-art approaches in conversion
modeling. Our analysis motivates the idea of weighting the log loss
with the business value of the predicted outcome. We present and
analyze a new cost weighting scheme and show that significant
gains in offline and online performance can be achieved.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Online advertising is becoming a large part of the global marketing
reaching $170 billion revenue in 2015 [1]. Depending on the goal of
the advertising campaign, different pricing schemes exist, but out
of them, brand and performance advertising are the most prevalent.
Brand advertising is used by advertisers that want to maximize the
exposure of their advertising message to online users and is priced
in terms of number of ad impressions, with the cost usually referred
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as CPM (cost-per-mille). By contrast, performance advertising is
appealing to advertisers that are interested in reaching certain mea-
surable goals such as increased number of visits to their websites,
increased number of leads, sales or downloads. In this case, the cost
is referred as CPC (cost-per-(ad)click) or CPA (cost-per-conversion).
Themarketplace thatmakes online advertising possible is roughly
formed out of three types of players, namely the advertiser (the
demand of ad display opportunities), the publisher (the offer of
ad display opportunities) and the auction house, represented by a
Real-Time Bidding (RTB) platform. Most of the RTB platforms use
a 2nd price model [16], where advertisers or agents representing
the advertisers bid for display opportunities, and the winner pays
the maximum between the bid of the second highest bidder in the
auction and the reserve price. In order to determine the winner
for CPC and CPA clients, where the pay-off to the publisher is
conditioned on a user action, the bids get converted in expected
values (also known as eCPMs) using click and conversion rate (CR)
prediction models.
The focus of this paper is on improving the performance of a
bidder, defined as an agent that takes the CPC or CPA that the
advertiser is willing to pay and submits a CPM bid for the impres-
sion. For CPA clients, this bidder takes as input the CPA, that is the
value of the sale for the advertiser, computes a predicted CR and
produces a bid. One important aspect of the marketplace is that the
numeric range of the possible CPAs is large and depends on the
economic value of the sale. The resulting eCPMs vary from ones
based on expectations over sales that are frequent and low-value
(e.g. song downloads) and ones that are rare and high-value (e.g.
hotel reservations). An improvement in prediction performance
on high CPA sales has a bigger impact on the revenue than a sim-
ilar improvement that affects low CPA traffic. To take this into
account during evaluation, recently proposed metrics on bidding
performance make use of the associated CPAs [5, 9].
In this paper, we investigate a novel way of taking into account
the sales’ CPAs in our CR prediction model for bidding in online
advertising auctions, thus bridging the gap between the recently
proposed business-aware offline metrics and the current state-of-
the-art CR prediction models. The outline is as follows. In Section 2,
we present the setting, i.e., our state-of-the-art CR model, the bidder
around it, and the recent business-aware offline metrics. Then, in
Section 3, we introduce our method for taking into account the
advertisers’ CPAs when training our CR model, which is based on
our analysis of the relationship between the Utility loss [9] and the
standard log loss. Finally, in Section 4, we present our experimental
results, both offline and online, before concluding in Section 5.
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2 SETTING
In this section, we discuss the setting of our method. We define the
following notations: letyi be the binary outcome variable indicating
if there was a sale or not, xi the input display features vector, ci the
display cost, vi the value of a conversion —the CPA the advertiser
provided— and N the size of the dataset.
2.1 Logistic regression for CR modelling
Current state-of-the-art CR prediction methods range from logistic
regression [6, 14], to log-linear models [2], to a combination of
log-linear models with decision trees [8], and to combining pure
response rate prediction with ad ranking [12]. In this paper, we use
the logistic regression approach from [6] because of the confirmed
state-of-the-art results on click prediction together with the relative
ease of implementation and the fact that the model learning can
be parallelized efficiently. In this case, the objective function to
optimize is the L2 regularized logistic loss:1
argmin
w
N∑
i=1
log(1 + exp(−yiw · xi )) + λ2 ∥w∥
2, (1)
with λ a regularization value to be tuned.
2.2 Bidder
We review in this section the way in which the probabilities of clicks
and conversions are used for bidding in an online advertiser auction.
The setting is as follows. A bidder is an agent that competes for an
impression that needs to submit a CPM bid to a RTB platform for
that impression. It values a certain action—click or conversion—at a
certain valuev and estimates the probability of the user performing
that action if the ad is displayed to be p. The value of the impression
is thus p ×v and since most RTB platforms rely on second prices
auctions, the bidder uses that value for its bid.
Let c be the highest competing bid in that auction. If that value
is smaller than the bid p ×v , the bidder wins the auction and pays
the second price c . The payoff of the auction can thus be written as:{
y ×v − c if p ×v > c
0 otherwise (2)
2.3 Offline Metrics
Let us now detail the recent business-aware offlinemetrics (Weighted
MSE, Utility) that approximate the business impact of a model
change.
Weighted MSE. For a CR model, the classical mean squared er-
ror (MSE) can be interpreted as the offline metric that penalizes
the volume of poorly explained observed sales. This metric can
be extended to weight the display-level squared error with the
CPA of the corresponding advertiser and to therefore penalize the
model proportionally to the unexplained revenue2— thus yielding
a Weighted MSE (MSEW).
MSEW =
1
N
∑
i
((yi − p(xi )) · vi )2 (3)
1While writing down the logistic loss, we assume that the labels are in {−1, 1} instead
of {0, 1}.
2Because CPA times sales is commensurate to revenue.
Utility. On the other hand, the Utility3 metric [5] allows to model
offline the potential change in profit due to a prediction model
change. Since the observed profit in historical data is fixed, this
metric makes the assumption that the display costs are determined
by the highest second bids coming from a second price auction and
that they are generated according to a distribution conditioned on
the observed display cost:
Utility =
∑
i
∫ p(xi )vi
0
(yi · vi − c˜) Pr(c˜ | ci )dc˜ (4)
The distribution Pr(c˜ | c) specifies what could have been the
second price instead of the observed cost c; [5] suggests a Gamma
distribution with α = βc + 1 and free parameter β . The motivation
for selecting this distribution is that it interpolates nicely between
two limit distributions: a Dirac distribution centered at c (as β →
+∞) and an improper uniform distribution (as β → 0). The former
limit case boils down to the empirical utility (2) while the latter
is equivalent to the weighted MSE (3) [9, Theorem 2]. The reason
for using a distribution around the observed price cost c is that
it allows us to penalize model overpredictions on historical data
(since all predictions that go over the second price receive the same
reward under a utility metric formulation with deterministic cost).
3 METHOD
As we have seen, there is a discrepancy between the CPA-aware
offlinemetrics and the standard loss functions of the current models,
such as the log loss function optimized in the logistic regression.
This is suboptimal, as current state-of-the-art models for online
bidding suffer from misspecification4 [9]. We propose the following
method to solve this problem.
3.1 Connection between Utility and Weighted
Log Loss
To the best of our knowledge, the only solution to this problem
was proposed in [9], where the authors design a specific loss func-
tion (the Utility loss) that take into account the bidder economic
performance and which inspired the work on the Utility metric [5].
However, the Utility loss is non-convex as shown in Figure 1 of
[9]. We start by investigating the relationship between the Utility
loss and the standard log loss, which is used for training current
state-of-the-art CR models, in order to determine whether we could
extend the standard log loss to solve the problem at hand.
There are several choices to model the distribution of the highest
competing bid Pr(c˜ | c) in (4). A common distribution mentioned
in [9] is the log-normal distribution, as it nicely captures the fact
that the uncertainty in the highest competing bid should be relative
to the specific bid. We will use this distribution in this section as it
makes the analysis easier. Let σ 2 be the fixed variance of the log
normal distribution and µ = log(c) − σ 2/2 chosen in such a way
that the mean value is c:
Pr(c˜ | c,σ ) = 1√
2π c˜σ
exp
(
−(log(c˜/c) + σ
2/2)2
2σ 2
)
.
3This metric is called expected Utility in [5], but we refer to it as Utility in this paper.
4A regression model is considered misspecified when one of the variables is correlated
with the error term, both due to omitted variables bias and due to functional form
misspecification.
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The Utility loss is defined as the opposite of the expected Utility:
ℓσ (p,y,v, c) :=
∫ pv
0
(c˜ − yv) Pr(c˜ | c,σ )dc˜ .
Of course we cannot make a general connection between the Utility
loss and the log loss since the highest competing bid c is involved
in the definition of the former, but not in the latter. We can however
analyze the behavior of the Utility loss when c is close to our bid
pv . Note that we expect most of the auctions to be in that regime.
First of all, the derivative of the loss with respect to the prediction
p is:
∂ℓ
∂p
= v2(p − y) Pr(c˜ = pv | c,σ ).
Assuming the highest competing bid is equal to our bid, (i.e.
c = pv), and combining the two previous equations, we get:
∂ℓ
∂p
= v2(p − y) × 1
pv
× exp(−σ
2/8)√
2πσ
∝ v(p − y)
p
.
Let us now compare the derivatives of the Utility loss and the
log loss under the additional assumptions that the probabilities are
small (p ≪ 1), which is typically the case in display advertising.
y = 0 y = 1
Log loss 11−p ≈ 1 − 1p
Utility loss v v(p−1)p ≈ −vp
We observe that the derivatives are approximately equal, up
to a factor v . This result motivates the idea of weighting the log
loss with the value associated with the sale that we are trying to
predict in order to better align the loss used during training and
the offline metrics. This can be seen as an extension of the earlier
result of [9] which shows that under a uniform distribution of the
largest opponent bid, the Utility loss is equivalent to the squared
loss weighted by the value. Of course, this approximation works
only as long as c ≈ pv . If this is not the case, directly optimizing
the Utility could lead to better performances.
3.2 Weighted Log Loss
As a result of our findings from Section 3.1, we introduce a weighted
negative log likelihood (denoted as WNLL) in the context of online
bidding and study its behavior. We define:
WNLL =
N∑
i=1
vi log(1 + exp(−yiw · xi )) + λ2 ∥w∥
2, (5)
where N is the size of the dataset, xi is the feature vector, w is
the parameters vector, yi is the true outcome and λ is the hyper-
parameter that controls the importance of the L2 regularization
factor. Each display is weighted by vi , the CPA of the advertiser
associated with the ith display. This is equivalent with generating
a dataset where the examples from each advertiser are re-sampled
proportionally with its CPA, but with the advantage of not incurring
an increase in storage and processing time.
Relationship with Utility loss. To investigate how this weighting
scheme compares to the Utility loss, we use the following toy ex-
ample. In Figure 1, we plot several losses as a function of a fixed
predicted conversion rate on an equal mix of two advertisers with
very different conversion rates pa = 0.1% and pb = 1% (both p ≪ 1).
The CPAs of these advertisers are respectively 50 and 5 and the sec-
ond prices follow a uniform distribution on [0.04, 0.06]. With this
setting the advertiser optimal profits and the associated empirical
losses are equal and close to zero (to simulate the c ≈ pv regime
introduced above).
The Utility loss here and in the rest of this paper is the same as
the one defined in [5] where the highest competing bid Pr(c˜ | c)
distribution follows a Gamma distribution with α = βc + 1 and free
parameter β . As β goes to infinity, the distribution goes to a Dirac
distribution centered around c and the Utility loss converges to the
empirical utility (2). We set here β = 30.
The figure shows that the Utility loss has the same optimum
point with the empirical utility and that the log loss weighted by
CPA (WNLL) has a minimum much closer to the empirical loss q∗
that the un-weighted log loss (NLL): q∗ = 0.1%, q∗WNLL = 0.18%,
q∗NLL = 0.55%.
Figure 1:Weighted log loss vs. log loss and Utility loss for an
intercept-only model on a synthetic dataset with two adver-
tisers.
3.3 Impact of weighting on learning
In the following, we analyze the impact of moving from a standard
log loss to weighted log loss both from the perspective of learning
and of regularization.
Learning with importance weights. We analyze the learning setup
proposed in [6] where limited memory BFGS [13, 15] (L-BFGS)
is warm-started with stochastic gradient descent [3] (SGD). For
both algorithms, we multiply the gradient of the loss of each ex-
ample by v , where v is the weight associated with the example.
This is straightforward to implement. Note that exact importance
weighting for SGD is more tricky and that dedicated weighting
schemes exist [11]. However, in our case, we use SGD only for
warm-starting L-BFGS and our approximate method of including
importance weights proved to be sufficient.
Impact on the regularization parameter. In the case of switching
from log loss to the weighed log loss, the value of the λ hyper-
parameter for NLL needs to be adapted to WNLL. To do that, we
use the following simple rule that adapts λ depending on the value
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Weighting ∆MSEW (negative is better) ∆Utilityβ=10 (positive is better) ∆Utilityβ=1000 (positive is better)
Train Test Train Test Train Test
CPA -50.45% ± 0.91 -19.57% ± 0.65 1.44% ± 0.02 0.37% ± 0.04 1.29% ± 0.03 0.18% ± 0.08
CPA
1
2 -36.84% ± 0.67 -14.57% ± 0.49 0.91% ± 0.01 0.32% ± 0.02 0.89% ± 0.03 0.30% ± 0.04
CPA
1
4 -24.54% ± 0.46 -9.26% ± 0.3 0.51% ± 0.01 0.18% ± 0.01 0.51% ± 0.02 0.19% ± 0.03
Table 1: Overfitting in WNLL as a function of the CPA weighting scheme. The best performing result for each metric in terms
of relative improvement over NLL is indicated in bold. The objective of the twomethods is to minimize MSEW (Mean Squared
Error weighted by impact on revenue) and to alternatively maximize Utility (a proxy for profit).
Λ ∆Utilityβ=1000
λh − 40% 0.34% ± 0.09
λh − 20% 0.32% ± 0.05
λh − 10% 0.29% ± 0.05
λh 0.30% ± 0.04
λh + 10% 0.33% ± 0.03
λh + 20% 0.21% ± 0.03
Table 2: Comparison of different values of λ around the heuristic value λh computed by the method covered in Section 3.3.
of the importance weights used, i.e. of the average CPA of each
advertiser:
λWNLL = λNLL ×
∑
i vi
N
(6)
For our experiments we use the following heuristic to set the
value of λ in the un-weighted case, as suggested in [4, 10]:
λhNLL =
1
N
N∑
i=1
∥xi ∥22 (7)
where xi represents a training instance vector and n is the size of
the dataset.
We show how well the lambda rescaling scheme performs rel-
ative to other values of λ in the context of L2 regularization in
Table 2 in Section 4.
4 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we present our experimental results when applying
our method to improve a state-of-the-art conversion-rate prediction
model for bidding in online advertising auctions. We present offline
results followed by online experiments on live traffic.
4.1 Offline results on public dataset
For comparing WNLL and NLL, we used a public dataset released
by Criteo as supporting material of [4]. The dataset contains a
sample of post-click conversions with a matching window of 30
days. For simplicity, we choose the setup (denoted by the authors
as the "oracle" setup), where we use for training the entire set of
positive examples (clicked displays that converted within the next
30 days) and apply the model without leaving a 30 days window
for evaluation, as it would be needed in a live system.
So far in the paper we have assumed a model predicting the
conversions at the display level. Since the records in this public
dataset are at the click level, we will instead consider in this section
the task of predicting a probability of conversion given click. In
order for this to be used in a production system the post-click
probability would need to be further multiplied by a probability of
click given display, as explained in [4].
Since the objective of the dataset was to show empirically the
importance of modeling delayed conversions, the associated dis-
play costs and conversion revenue are not included. To be able to
evaluate our method, we introduce a simplified cost and revenue
scheme where all clicks have a constant cost of 1, and for each
advertising campaign the CPA is inversely proportional with the
historical post-click conversion rate, meaning that each advertising
campaign c is assumed to be contributing equally to the overall
revenue: costc = 1,CPAc = 1AvдCRc and AvдCRc is the campaign
average CR with smoothing as explained below.
For the experimental results, we compare the results of the base-
line log loss (NLL) and the results of the weighted log loss (WNLL).
We take a 2 weeks period (weeks 3 and 4) as the test period (each
model is trained on a period of up to three weeks and used to
predict the conversion rate on next day traffic). For the historical
CR estimate, we use the 2 weeks period before the first test day
(weeks 1 and 2) to compute average conversion rates for the cam-
paigns. To handle the case of new campaigns appearing during
the testing period, we set the final campaign CR estimator to be:
SmoothCRc =
#salesc+AvдCR
#clicksc+1 where AvдCR is the overall average
CR computed in the two weeks and is equal to 0.23.
Offline metrics. The evaluation metrics are the MSEW (3) and
the Utility (4) computed using a Gamma distribution with free
parameter β as in [5]. Amore accurate model is expected to decrease
the MSEW and increase the Utility. All the results presented in this
section are provided with confidence intervals computed using
bootstrap.
The impact of CPA weight factor on performance. As previously
covered in the cost-sensitive learning literature [7], associating
big costs to the training examples can lead to overfitting. We have
Cost-sensitive Learning for Utility Optimization in
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Metric Global HighCPA(>10) HighCPA(>10), LowSales(<30)
∆MSEW -14.57% ± 0.49 -15.26% ± 0.53 -22.36% ± 1.02
∆Utilityβ=10 0.32% ± 0.02 0.78% ± 0.06 1.70% ± 0.16
∆Utilityβ=1000 0.30% ± 0.04 0.78% ± 0.11 1.72% ± 0.21
Table 3: Relative improvement of WNLL vs. NLL on the open Criteo dataset, both globally and for advertising campaigns with
high CPA.
established experimentally on our internal traffic that the best so-
lution to combat overfitting is reducing the amplitude of the final
weights used during model learning by a combination of capping
the maximum values of the CPAs and a magnitude reduction func-
tion (sqrt) on the CPA. In Table 1 we show the relative performance
of various CPA dampening schemes on the open dataset, for a max-
imum value of CPA =20. We see that the amount of overfitting in
terms of MSEW is comparable across all of the three weighting
schemes, but that CPA
1
2 overfits less in terms of Utilityβ=1000 and
has better performance on the test set. Another practical benefit of
capping the CPA weights is that the CPA estimate can be noisy to
start with, especially in the case of new campaigns or of campaigns
with low number of sales. Without capping, the model might learn
to fit only campaigns with very high CPA and predict with the
intercept for the others. Though capping introduces bias in the
CPA estimate, as long as the resulting weighting scheme is closer
to the actual revenue breakdown over campaigns than the baseline
uniform weighting (CPA=1), WNLL will likely outperform NLL.
Impact of λ. We benchmark λ values around the value λh pro-
duced by the heuristic proposed in Section 3.3. We observe in table
2 that the proposed λ is very close to the optimal value. This finding
mirrors the results obtained on internal data. For this reason, we
use the λ proposed by the heuristic in all our experiments.
WNLL vs. NLL on high CPA. In Table 3, we report performance
of our best WNLL setup (with weighting scheme CPA
1
2 ) on the
evaluation metrics that are closest to the actual business metrics,
e.g. MSEW and Utility. We observe that the biggest lift of WNLL
vs. NLL is on the advertising campaigns with high CPA and a low
number of sales (<30) in the period of reference (weeks 1 and 2).
This confirms our hypothesis that WNLL should outperform NLL
on campaigns with low volume of sales, but high CPA. Because of
that, the actual economic impact of switching to WNLL could be
even greater, depending of the relative proportion of traffic with
high CPA and low number of positives. As we will show next, our
online experiments confirm this finding.
4.2 Online experiments
We ran an A/B test of the change of the loss function to WNLL in
the conversion-rate model. The A/B test was done on more than
1 Billion ad displays, on world-wide traffic. Our change resulted
in a +2% lift in ROI, which is a considerable lift compared to typi-
cal improvements in this field. We observed significant savings in
display cost, coupled with an increase in sales performance for the
advertisers, especially on the campaigns with high CPA and low
number of sales that account for a significant proportion of revenue.
In terms of development and operational costs, the change in the
loss function took only a couple of weeks to put in production, since
the code change is minimal, as shown in Section 3. Furthermore,
the training time of the model did not change.
5 CONCLUSION
We investigated the relationship between the Utility loss and the
standard log loss. This analysis motivated the idea of weighting
the log loss with the value associated with the sale that we are
trying to predict (CPA) in order to better align the loss used during
training and the offline metrics. Then, we presented and analyzed
a cost weighting scheme that takes into account the advertisers’
CPAs when training a CR model for bidding in online advertising
auctions and discussed its impact on learning and regularization.
We showed that this cost weighting scheme leads to a loss function
whose optimal point is much closer to the optimum point (reached
by optimizing the Utility loss) than the one of the standard log
loss. We finally demonstrated that our method allows us to im-
prove a state-of-the-art CR prediction model used for bidding in
online advertising auctions and leads to large significant lifts in
offline performance (on a public data set) and online performance
as evaluated through an A/B test.
Future work. As future work, we plan on investigating two di-
rections. First, optimize directly the Utility loss [9], which is non-
convex and thus requires careful optimization. Second, use a dif-
ferent convex approximation of the Utility loss, as proposed in [9,
Section 6].
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